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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant Erick Virgil Hall ("Hall") appeals, with permission from the
Idaho Supreme Court, from two of the district court's interlocutory orders, including (I)
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petitioner's Supplemental Motion for
Discovery and (2) Court's Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Juror Contact.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2004, Hall was found guilty by a jury of the first-degree murder, first-degree
kidnapping and rape ofLynn Henneman ("Lynn"). (R., pp.581-83.) That same jury also
found four statutory aggravating factors and concluded, when weighed against each
statutory aggravatoring factor individually, all of the mitigating circumstances were not
sufficiently compelling to make imposition of the death penalty unjust. (R., pp.609-12.)
Hall was sentenced to death for Lynn's first-degree murder; consecutive unified fixed life
sentences were imposed for first-degree kidnapping and rape.

(R., pp.661-63.)

Judgments were filed January 19,2005. (Id.) A Notice of Appeal was filed January 21,
2005 (R., pp.685-88), and the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") was appointed
to represent Hall on appeal and during post-conviction proceedings (R., pp.689-91).
Hall's initial Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed March 1, 2005.
(UPCPA, R., pp.9-34.) On January 5, 2006, Hall filed his initial thirty-one page Motion
for Discovery containing over 330 separate requests, two appendices and a supporting
brief (UP CPA, R., pp.78-109A, exhibits 1 and 2), which included a request to depose
"[all] members of the defense team and their agents," including investigator Glenn Elam
("Elam") (UPCPA, R., p.lOl). At a hearing, Hall conceded it "would be fruitful" to
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amend his petition "so that we can, if possible, tie our specific requests to claims that
thereafter would be raised." (UPCPA, Tr., 2-6-06, pp.64-65.) The Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief was filed April 17,2006. (UPCPA, R., pp.l55-363.)
Hall also filed a motion to issue subpoenas (UPCPA, R., pp.l42-53), requesting
he be permitted to depose his two trial attorneys, Amil Myshin ("Myshin") and D.C. Carr
("Carr"), Elam and the mitigation specialist, Rosanne Dapsauski ("Dapsauski"), based
upon the need "to identify additional claims for post-conviction relief whether such
claims involve the ineffective assistance of counselor judicial, juror, or prosecutorial
misconduct" (id., p.146). Without objection from the state (UPCPA, Tr., 7-5-06, pp.15682), the district court granted Hall's motion to depose his two trial attorneys, but denied
the motion without prejudice as to Elam and Dapsauski (UPCPA, R., pp.520-21).
Hall conceded some of his initial discovery requests were not "specifically"
related to claims in his Amended Petition (UPCPA, exhibit 10, pp.3-4, 13, 16-18), but
renewed his request to depose Elam (id., p.20), even though Hall conceded Elam was
being "cooperative with [Hall's] investigator" (UPCPA, Tr., 1-16-07, p.31). Despite the
state's suggestion that Elam simply complete an affidavit, Hall contended, "I think
deposing Mr. Elam is critical to answering the question: What did trial counsel know."
(Id., p.34.) Recognizing Elam was cooperating with Hall's investigation, the district
court denied the request to depose Elam, concluding, "He has been cooperative. I think it
is simply urmecessary to depose him. It would likely result in substantial additional
delay, and there are alternatives to it." (Id., p.35.) The vast majority of Hall's remaining
discovery requests were granted. (UPCPA, R., pp.864-87.)
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Hall filed a Sealed Supplemental Motion for Discovery, which included a request
for the depositions of Jay Rosenthal, Detective Daniel Hess, and Roger Bourne and/or
Greg Bower. (UP CPA, confidential exhibit 2, pp.9-11.) The motion further renewed
Hall's request to depose Elam "to fill the gaps in the testimony of trial counsel regarding
the scope of their guilt and sentencing phase investigations" because, while Elam had
been interviewed by the SAPD resulting in "relevant information for a final amended
petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Elam has refused to sign an affidavit without
express consent from former lead trial counsel, Amil Myshin," who had not responded to
requests for consent. (ld., p.9.) The district court denied Hall's motion, concluding he
failed to meet his burden of establishing the depositions "are necessary to protect the
substantial rights of the petitioner." (UP CPA, R., pp.l 044-46.)
While Hall's discovery motions were being litigated, an informal telephone
conference was held January 6, 2006, regarding the release of juror questionnaire forms
(UPCPA, Tr., 2-15-06, pp.13-14), during which the district court expressed "strong views
about access to jurors, frankly and said that there would not be any unless and until
counsel came back with a specific motion" (id., p.15). While no oral or written orders
were entered (UPCPA, Tr., 2-15-06, p.13), it was clear the court did not want Hall's
attorneys contacting jurors "without coming back with a specific motion" (id., p.1S). On
January 20, 2006, Hall filed a motion and supporting brief (UPCPA, R., pp.112-14,
exhibit 3, pp.5-S), contending "juror interviews are critical to uncovering and
investigating juror misconduct claims, and denying counsel the ability to so investigate
violates Petitioner's rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution" (UPCPA, exhibit 3, p.6). Examining
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Hall's motion, the court discussed its concerns that jurors would be threatened,
intimidated and harassed, and while not denying his motion, explained, "you need prior
express permission from the Court." (UPCPA, Tr., 2-15-06, pp.l5-16, 40-42, 44.)
On June 1, 2007, Hall filed a Motion for Juror Contact with a supporting brief
asking to interview the jury and alternative jurors, incorporating not only the bases
articulated in his prior motion, but the First Amendment.

(UPCPA, R., pp.961-63;

exhibit 12.) Hall's supporting memorandum also included questions he "anticipated"
asking jurors, which included the following general categories: (1) knowledge of
undisclosed witnesses; (2) awareness of Hall's shackles; (3) undisclosed information
during voir dire or in juror questionnaires; (4) juror experimentation, crime scene visits,
or consideration of other extra record evidence; (5) extraneous influences or evidence; (6)
extrinsic evidence found in reference materials; (7) religious sources or influences; (8)
media exposure and exposure to the Hanlon case; (9) premature jury deliberations; (l0)
juror bias regarding Hall's dangerousness; and (ll) improper consideration of the
exercise of constitutional rights. (UPCPA, exhibit 12, pp.l3-18.) The memorandum also
included questions that would be asked to specific jurors. (Id., pp.18-28.)
At an initial hearing, prior to its written response being filed, the state agreed to
limited juror contact, proposing, "there can be some juror contact I think," which would
be "in some kind of a hearing so that the process of talking to jurors who agree to this
would occur in the courtroom before this Court." (UPCPA, Tr., 6-16-07, p.20.) The state
further proposed the district court send the jurors a letter "notifying them of this
information, rather than it come[ing] from the State or the defense, and that there be a
hearing, if any agree to that." (Id., p.21.) Although not ruling on Hall's motion, the court
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noted its concern regarding the need to "treat with courtesy and respect and provide
reasonable privacy for jurors" or "we are not going to have any jurors willing to serve,
period, in difficult cases." (Id., p.25.)
The state addressed all of Hall's anticipated questions, objecting to "unrestricted
access to the jurors," suggesting any questioning "should only be done in the Court's
presence so the Court can enforce its order restricting the questions." (UPCPA, R.,
pp.968-84.) Addressing the state's concession that any questioning could be done in the
district court's presence, Hall responded, "we strongly feel should be rejected by the
Court. There are so many psychological reasons for not doing that. And there's no
support in law. Again, there's nothing prohibiting us from contacting these people."
(UPCPA, Tr., 8-8-07, p.121.) After reviewing each of Hall's proposed questions, the
district court denied his motion. (Id., pp.123-45.) In its written order filed September 17,
2007, the court concluded the motion was "part of discovery," the claims "relating to
possible jury misconduct are made without factual support" and I.R.E. 606(b) "serves to
protect jurors from 'post trial inquiry or harassment. '" (UPCP A, R, pp.l 020-24.)
On August 23,2007, Hall filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, asking that he
be permitted to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's orders
prohibiting juror contact and taking Elam's deposition. (UPCPA, R, pp.996-1006.) The
district court denied Hall's motion. (UPCPA, R, pp.1527-28.) On February 22, 2008,
the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting Hall's motion for an interlocutory
appeal on "discretionary decisions: I. Contact with jurors; and 2. Deposition of
Investigator, Glenn Elam." (UPCPA, R., pp.1570-71.) Pursuant to the supreme court's
order, Hall filed a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2008. (Id., pp.1565-69.)
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ISSUES

Hall has phrased the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Whether the district court's order forbidding any communications
with jurors unless Mr. Hall can first demonstrate that such
communications are necessary to protect his substantial rights,
violates his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution? [sic]

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by forbidding Mr.
Hall's attorneys and their agents from contacting jurors? [sic]

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr.
Hall's motion for a court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels'
investigator where the investigator could provide information
relevant to his post-conviction claims but was unwilling to
voluntarily provide an affidavit? [sic]

(Brief, p.5.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Because Hall failed to establish Elam' s deposition was necessary to protect Hall's
substantial rights and because he was permitted to depose both of his trial
attorneys, has he failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to depose Elam?

2.

Because Hall failed to establish ex parte and unbridled post-verdict interviews
with the jurors and alternate jurors was relevant and necessary to any claim in his
amended post-conviction petition, but rather were merely fishing expeditions to
gather information to raise claims that were not even alleged in his amended
petition, has he failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by not
permitting him to conduct such post-verdict interviews?
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ARGUMENT

1.
Hall Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying His Request To Depose Elam
A.

Introduction
Hall contends, "[ u]nder the circumstances of this case" his "requested discovery

was mandatory" because he "provided a statement of claims in his petition to which Mr.
Elam's testimony was relevant and necessary to establish the scope of the investigation
conducted in relationship to these claims." (Brief, p.26.) Alternatively, Hall contends the
district court abused its discretion by denying his request to depose Elam "because the
Court's denial was based on misapplication of the relevant law and facts," based upon the
contention that "trial counsel could not provide either a complete or accurate description
of their investigation" thereby preventing Hall from "fully developing his claims"
without Elam's deposition, and erroneously concluding Elam was "fully cooperative with
Mr. Hall's investigation." (Brief, pp.26, 36.)
Because he deposed his trial attorneys and he attempts to tie his request to depose
Elam to a single claim and minor discrepancy in Carr's deposition, Hall has failed to
establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to depose Elam ..

B.

Standard Of Review
Discovery in post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter left to the discretion of

the district court and will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion.
Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 319, 912 P.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996). When this Court
reviews a ruling for abuse of discretion, it does so through a multi-tiered inquiry,
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"examining 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 2009 WL 1835331, *1 (Ct. App.
2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989».

C.

General Standards Of Law For Discovery In Post-Conviction Cases
While post-conviction cases are civil in nature, State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho

676, 678, 662 P.2d 548 (1983), the rules of discovery contained in Idaho's rules of civil
procedure do not apply in post-conviction cases. I.C.R. 57(b). "When an applicant
believes discovery is necessary for acquisition of evidence to support a claim for postconviction relief, the applicant must obtain authorization from the court to conduct
discovery." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006).
"Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district
court is not required to order discovery." Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21
P.3d 924 (2001). In Raudebaugh, the petitioner made conclusory statements about what
an expert and investigator might have testified to at trial but did not point to specific
facts. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of discovery
because "Raudebaugh' s allegations only argue what the experts might have testified to
had trial counsel employed them. Raudebaugh's allegations are speculative." Id.
In Aeschilman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1999), the
court denied post-conviction discovery because the applicant failed to "identify the type
of information that he or she may obtain through discovery that could affect the
disposition of his or her application for post-conviction relief." See also LePage v. State,
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138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064 (Ct. App. 2003) ("In order to be granted discovery, a
post-conviction applicant must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is
requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application").

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Hall's Request To
Depose Elam
Initially, Hall raises a due process claim, contending he has a "constitutional right

to meaningful post-conviction proceedings," which is "hollow if there is not a meaningful
opportunity to develop a factual basis for all post-conviction claims." (Brief, p.27.)
Hall's argument is nothing more than a derivative of an argument already rejected by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in Aeschilman, 132 Idaho at 402 - that Idaho's post-conviction
discovery procedures allegedly violate due process. Because Hall has failed to even cite
Aeschilman, let alone explain why it is distinguishable or should be overruled, his
argument must be rejected. As explained by the court of appeals:
[I]n contrast to ordinary civil litigation, the typical disincentives against
unfettered discovery do not exist in the post-conviction arena. First, there
is little if any financial disincentive from engaging in unlimited discovery,
because an applicant for post-conviction relief is usually indigent and
proceeds pro se or is appointed counsel. Thus unbridled discovery costs
the applicant nothing and sanctions for discovery abuses are, for the most
part, impractical.
Id., at 401.
The court of appeals' rationale is particularly true in capital cases because deathsentenced inmates have every incentive to delay their cases through oppressive and
unduly burdensome discovery that is designed to merely increase the costs of capital
litigation. In fact, as a result of the incentive death-sentenced inmates have to "thwart
their sentences," the Idaho Legislature enacted I.e. § 19-2719, which is designed to
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"avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that all collateral claims for relief ... be
consolidated in one proceeding .... ," which has been expressly affirmed by the Idaho
Supreme Court. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988).
Relying upon the steady beat of "death is different," Hall also contends he should
have been permitted to depose Elam based upon "heightened procedural safeguards" in
capital cases. (Brief, p.37.) While the courts have applied such safeguards in limited
situations, Hall has cited only one federal district court case, Payne v. Bell, 89 F.Supp.2d
967, 971 (W.D. TelID. 2000), to support his contention.

Of course, because Payne

involves a discovery standard in federal habeas cases, it is inapposite. Moreover, the
state is unaware of such a standard being used in any other federal habeas case. Rather,
the federal standard permits the district court to order discovery "provided that the habeas
petitioner presents specific allegations showing reason to believe that the facts, if fully
developed, may lead to habeas relief." Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 602 (6 th Cir. 2001).1
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has never adopted a "death is different approach" to
post conviction discovery issues.

The Idaho Legislature has enacted legislation to

expedite capital cases, not facilitate delay associated with unbridled discovery. See I.C. §

1 The "good cause" standard for discovery in federal habeas has been modified as a result
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). In Boyko v. Parke,
259 F.3d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2001), the court recognized if a habeas petitioner engages
in discovery and expansion of the record under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules Governing §
2254 Cases "to achieve the same end as an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner ought to be
subject to the same constraints that would be imposed if he had sought an evidentiary
hearing." In Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1248-49 (11 th Cir. 2002), the court addressed
the limitations on discovery that were imposed by the AEDP A, explaining, "Congress
modified the discretion afforded to the district court and erected additional barriers
limiting a habeas petitioner's right to discovery or an evidentiary hearing."

10

19-2719. Moreover, in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291,17 P.3d 230 (2000), the Idaho
Supreme Court expressly applied LC.R. 57 to a capital case, explaining:
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put
to the sound discretion of the district court. LC.R. 57(b). The discovery
provisions in the civil rules, which generally apply to proceedings on an
application for post-conviction relief, are not applicable unless so ordered
by the district court. Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 825 P.2d 94 (Ct.
App. 1992). There is no requirement that the district court order
discovery, unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's
substantial rights. Id.
Hall's principle argument centers on his contention that the district court's denial
of Elam's deposition constituted an abuse of discretion because it was necessary to
protect his "substantial rights" where he allegedly identified claims that Elam's
deposition would support and the type of information he would obtain from Elam in
support of those claims. (Brief, pp.27-37.) However, the only claim upon which Hall

now relies is an allegation that "trial counsel failed to investigate an alternate perpetrator
or co-perpetrator defense"; presumably an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (Brief, pp.27-28.) But the portion of the
amended petition upon which Hall relies - claim D-7 - involves a claim that the state
allegedly withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), by failing to disclose favorable evidence regarding a "potential alternate
perpetrator," not a failure to investigate by his attorneys or Elam. (Brief, pp.27-29 (citing
UPCPA, R., pp.l90-92).) Hall's attempt to now change the claim from a Brady violation
to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to support his request to depose Elam cannot
be countenanced by this Court and demonstrates his true purpose in deposing Elam was
to embark on a fishing expedition to raise new claims for his final amended petition,
which was filed October 5, 2007. (UPCPA, R., pp.1053-1350.)
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Moreover, even if Hall had raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, both
in his amended petition and on appeal as a basis for deposing Elam, the argument fails
because Hall had already deposed Myshin and Carr. (UPCP A, exhibit 15 containing
exhibits 13-16 of Hall's Final Amended Petition.)

Myshin explained the defense

investigated the "alternate perpetrator" theory involving Patrick Hoffert ("Hoffert"):
Q.

So maybe there's another person, possibly?

A.
All the DNA shows that they had sex. Well, we had
Christian Johnson. I mean, that was obvious. We had the 13 th Alelle,
which was obvious. So there was some information that we had, even
before the trial, that there was somebody else involved. Then towards the
end we had that guy Pat what's-his-face.

Q.

Hoffert?

A.
Yeah. We knew about that and looked into that. So that
was a possibility, although it turned out there wasn't much there.
Q.
Can you tell me what your investigation revealed on
Patrick Hoffert?

A.
Yes. We got a police report late in the case from I think
Smith, Dave Smith. And it gave us the names of these people. And so we
had Glen -- or I had Glen go out and talk to them.
(UPCPA, exhibit 15 containing exhibit 13, pp.68-69.)
Not only did Myshin discuss his recollection of asking Elam to investigate the
alternate perpetrator theory, but he identified a note dated August 9, in which he was
"asking Glen to interview Peggy Hill and Lisa Lewis, amongst other individuals," which
apparently involved information regarding Hoffert. (Id., pp.70-71.) Myshin "assumed"
Elam interviewed Peggy Hill ("Hill") and Lisa Lewis ("Lewis"), which revealed
information "pretty much along the lines of the police report, that there wasn't anything
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else." (ld., pp.73-74.) Finally, when asked if Elam would be able to give more "detail
about those interviews," Myshin explained, "Probably not." (Id., p.74.)
Carr confirmed Elam conducted an investigation regarding Hoffert, although it
was his "belief' that he "heard" about Hoffert's statement - that he allegedly raped the
girl - after his representation of Hall was completed. (UPCP A, exhibit 15 containing
exhibit 15, pp.217-20.) Carr also confirmed that the alternate perpetrator theory, with
Hoffert as the alternative perpetrator, was discussed prior to trial because the defense
team "didn't like the idea of [Hall] being seen with Lynn Henneman right before she
died" (id., pp.221-22), but the defense chose not to present such a theory "in order to
keep out from the jury evidence that our client was actually seen with Lynn Henneman
that night" (id., p.224). Carr later reaffirmed that Hoffert was investigated by E1am as a
possible co-conspirator and that a strategic decision was made not to present such a
defense because "it puts Erick at the scene. That was a problem." (UPCPA, exhibit 15
containing exhibit 16, pp.320-22.) Moreover, Carr confirmed that if information that
Hoffert had allegedly raped Lynn was known before trial the outcome would not have
changed. (ld., pp.358-60.) In other words, the evidence would have also established Hall
was seen with Lynn, which was "very concerning," "delicate" and "could be
catastrophically bad for Erick Hall." (Id., pp.359-60.)
Moreover, Hall conceded Elam was being cooperative with his attempts to
investigate Myshin and Carr's "investigation." After deposing Myshin and Carr, Hall
expressly stated, "I can state to the Court that Mr. Elam has been cooperative with our
investigator, but has stated that he would not undergo deposition without court order."
(UPCPA, Tr., 1-16-07, p.3!.) Therefore, when the district court concluded Elam was
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being "cooperative" (id., p.35), it was based upon Hall's concession.

In lieu of a

deposition, Hall attempted to have Elam sign an affidavit, but Elam explained he required
Myshin's consent before he could sign the affidavit. (UPCPA, Tr., 8-8-07, p.62.) While
Hall attempted to obtain Myshin's consent, due to Myshin and Elam's "very busy
[schedule] at the Ada County public defender's office, he had been unsuccessful"; there
was no allegation that Myshin or Elam were trying to avoid giving or obtaining
permission to sign an affidavit or otherwise be uncooperative. (Id., p.63.) Responding to
Hall's motion, the prosecutor asserted the issue could be resolved without a deposition by
having Hall's investigator, Michael Shaw ("Shaw"), supply an affidavit regarding the
content of his conversations with Elam. (Id., p.63.) While Hall had concerns regarding
the admissibility of Shaw's deposition, he agreed, "if the Court were to deny that [the
deposition], in the alternative, then, we'd be willing to submit an affidavit for Mr. Shaw."
(Id., pp.64-65.) The district court denied Hall's motion to depose Elam, but concluded, "I
think the affidavit of Mr. Shaw may be an alternative." (Id., pp.65-66.)
However, instead of providing Shaw's affidavit to support his amended or final
post-conviction petition, Hall chose to file his Motion for Permission to Appeal (UPCP A,
R., pp.996-1006) with Shaw's affidavit detailing his conversations with Elam, which
included information that Elam interviewed Lewis on August 12, 2004, regarding Hoffert
allegedly having "raped a girl" (UP CPA, exhibit 13, appendix II).
Based upon the depositions of Myshin and Carr, coupled with Shaw's affidavit
confirming Elam interviewed Lewis on August 12,2004, well before commencement of
jury selection on September 29,2004, exactly how the district court abused its discretion
in denying Hall's request to depose Elam regarding claim D(7), whether as a Brady or
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Strickland claim, remains a mystery. Rather, it appears Hall's sole purpose in deposing
Elam is to fish for new claims that are not a part of his amended or final post-conviction
petitions, or simply increase the costs associated with his post-conviction case,
particularly where he has agreed that Shaw's affidavit regarding his interviews with Elam
was sufficient. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,108,967 P.2d 702 (1998) (affirming the
district court's order denying a capital petitioner's request to depose the trial judge where
there were alternative sources to obtain the same information).
The state appreciates Hall's desire to have the district court circumvent Idaho's
post-conviction discovery rules based upon American Bar Association ("ABA")
guidelines or standards that have been adopted by authors of various treatises. (Brief,
p.35.) However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Idaho Supreme Court
has concluded such standards are constitutionally mandated. The Supreme Court has
expressly recognized such standards are merely
guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No
particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counselor the
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel
must have in making tactical decisions. Indeed, the existence of detailed
guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding
mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Recently, the Supreme Court examined ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and recognized, "the Constitution does not codify the ABA's Model Rules."
Monteja v. Louisian!l, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2087 (2009). Moreover, referring to
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
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Cases (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court has declined the "invitation to adopt these
guidelines." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782, 948 P.2d 127 (1997).
Finally, Hall takes issue with the district court's concern that ordering
unnecessary and unwarranted depositions of support staff,

including defense

investigators, could result in fewer competent defense attorneys to defend capital
murderers and contends, "the district court's decision was not consistent with applicable
legal standards or a sound factual analysis." (Brief, pp.36-37 (quoting UPCPA, Tr., 1115-07, pp.18-19.) However, the district court's concern has been raised by the Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Addressing whether it is appropriate to

address only the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance claims, the Supreme Court
explained, "Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so
burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result."
Strickland 466 U.S. at 697. This problem has not been lost on the Ninth Circuit, which
explained, "An unfortunate offshoot of death penalty litigation has been the recurrent
demonization of prior counsel - no doubt sometimes justly, but sometimes not - through
the inevitable filing of Strickland claims.

Death penalty counsel, whether trial or

appellate, face the most demanding challenges the profession has to offer." Williams v.
Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 n.3 (9 th Cir. 1995). Clearly, the district court's concern
was not unwarranted or inconsistent with applicable legal standards.
Rather than requesting discovery that was necessary to protect his substantial
rights, Hall's request to depose Elam constitutes a fishing expedition, which is simply not
permitted because post-conviction cases are "not a vehicle for unrestrained testimony or
retesting of physical evidence introduced at the criminal trial." Murphy, 143 Idaho at
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148. Moreover, "[t]he scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for postconviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal." Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725,
932 P.2d 348 (1997). As explained in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983), "it
must be remembered that direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction
or sentence." While Barefoot involves the role of federal habeas in state convictions, as
explained in Mumhy, 143 Idaho at 148, the same is true for state post-conviction. Like
federal habeas, post-conviction proceedings are "secondary and limited. . .. not forums
in which to relitigate state trials." Barefoot, 463 at 887.
Because the district court correctly perceived the issue of granting Hall's motion
to depose Elam as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion
consistent with applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of
reason, Hall has failed to meet his burden of establishing the district court abused its
discretion by denying his request to depose Elam.

II.
Hall Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying His Motion For Unlimited And Unsupervised Interviews With
The Jury After He Had Been Found Guilty And Sentenced To Death
A.

Introduction
Hall initially contends the district court's order "imposed a prior restraint in

violation of First Amendment, impeded [his] post-conviction investigation in violation of
[due process], and eliminated an important procedural safeguard against the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment."
(Brief, p.6.) Assuming arguendo the district court had authority to deny his motion for
unlimited and unsupervised interviews with jurors (Brief, pp.20-2l), Hall next contends
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the district court erred by adopting a "discovery standard for juror contact," "exceeded its
authority" because there was no evidence establishing his attorneys or agents conunitted
misconduct, and "violated Idaho law by effectively interpreting I.R.E. 606(b) in a marmer
not supported by existing law, and by creating a new rule" that impeded his "rights to
conduct an independent and thorough post-conviction investigation." (Brief, pp.24-25.)
Hall's First Amendment and due process arguments have been universally
rejected by other jurisdictions, and he has failed to establish his "death is different"
argument warrants reversal of the district court's order. Because the district court had
inherent authority to regulate contact with jurors and the order from which he appeals is
from the denial of nothing more than a discovery motion, Hall has failed to establish the
court abused its discretion by denying his motion to contact jurors when his motion was
merely a fishing expedition searching for claims that had no factual support.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because Hall is appealing only from the district court's order denying his Motion

for Juror Contact, which is nothing more than an "investigative aid," the district court's
order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Row v. State, 131 Idaho 303,310-11,955
P.2d 1082 (1998); see also Anderson v. State, --- S.3d -"-, 2009 WL 1954982, *14 (Fla.
2009) ("A trial court's decision on a motion to interview jurors is reviewed pursuant to an
abuse of discretion standard").
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C.

Hall Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Order Violates The
Constitution
I.

The District Court's Order Does Not Violate The First Amendment

Hall correctly notes, "The term prior restraint is used to describe administrative
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the
time that such communications are to occur." Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,
550 (1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). However,
whether the district court's denial of Hall's motion constitutes a "prior restraint" is
debatable since judges regularly enter orders prohibiting litigants from various forms of
communication and Hall has failed to cite any case in which the Supreme Court's "prior
restraint" doctrine was applied to an order denying a motion to contact jurors after entry
of the judgment. There is not even universal acceptance of the "prior restraint" doctrine
in the context of news gathering by the media.

See State v. Montana Twenty-First

Judicial Dist. Ct., 933 P.2d 829, 838-39 (Mont. 1997) (discussing the "considerable
disagreement as to whether participant gag orders are prior restraints on the media").
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has agreed "with the majority of the States
that the 'substantial likelihood of material prejudice'

standard constitutes a

constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in
pending cases and the State's interest in fair trials," Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501
U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991), the Court has not adopted the four-step analysis contended by
Hall (Brief, p.8), nor has the standard been applied by the Court in cases that are not
"pending," i.e., cases in which the defendant has already been convicted and sentenced.
Rather, Gentile involved an attorney who made public statements hours after his client
was indicted in violation of Nevada's rules governing attorney conduct, and the Court
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repeatedly emphasized the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard was
being applied in the context of an attorney representing a defendant prior to and during
criminal proceedings. See Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d
425,431 (Tex. 1998) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Gentile focused on the lawyers'
public comments about pending cases in which they are involved, and expressly declined
to decide whether a higher standard applies to the speech of lawyers who are strangers to
the litigation"). Because the court in Benton concluded, "If the lawyer tries to continue
exerting his influence over the jurors after they have completed their service, he cannot
plausibly claim that he is doing so as an ordinary citizen," therefore, under the rationale
of Gentile, the court concluded the "likelihood of material prejudice" standard "is
sufficient protection for attorneys' speech in this context," id., but concluded the
attorney's letter did not violate the First Amendment under that standard, id., at 432.
While Idaho has not addressed the question of whether an order prohibiting postverdict juror interviews violates the First Amendment, other jurisdictions have rejected
such challenges. In Haeberle v. Texas Int'I Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1020 (5 th Cir. 1984),
the district court denied one of the parties' attorney leave to learn "some lesson" about
the basis for the jury's verdict, which was adverse to his client. While the Fifth Circuit
recognized "[wJeighty first amendment interests may be harmed by inhibiting the flow of
information from jurors to the public," "[tJhe petitioners' access to information from
jurors carries far less weight in the first amendment scale than a restriction on access to
information that affects political behavior." Id. at 1021-22. The court also explained,
"The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect its processes
from prejudicial outside interferences.

Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
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accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of
the court should be permitted to frustrate its purpose." Id., at 2022. Rejecting the First
Amendment argument, the court concluded, "We agree with the district court's implicit
conclusion that those interests are not merely balanced but plainly outweighed by the
jurors' interest in privacy and the public's interest in well-administered justice." Id.
Likewise, in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (loth Cir.
1986), the court recognized the necessity of "distinguish[ing] cases discussing contact
with jurors by news media from cases dealing with contact by parties or the attorneys that
took part in the trial," and explained, "[t]he media has less incentive to upset a verdict
than does a losing party or attorney. Thus, while a court may broadly proscribe attorney
and party contact with former jurors, it does not have the same freedom to restrict press
interviews with former jurors."
In Gagliano v. Ford Motor Co., 551 F.Supp. 1077 (D. Kansas 1982), the court
rejected a First Amendment claim challenging a local rule that limited attorneys' ability
to interview jurors after a verdict had been rendered. The court explained:
The rule protects jurors from harassment, decreases changes and
temptations for tampering, and promotes the finality of verdicts. The
service of a juror to the court is the cornerstone of our judicial system, and
competent jurors who are willing to serve are at a premium. An
unrestricted fishing expedition, such as that contemplated by plaintiff,
would make it seriously difficult to convince such jurors to serve.
Id. at 1079; see also United States v. Cleveland, 1997 WL 412466, *1 n.2 (E.D. La.
1997) (" There is no question that the Court's order restricting the parties and their
lawyers from contacting the jurors is constitutional"); United States v. Sokoloff, 696
F.Supp. 1451, 1457-58 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (relying upon policies articulated in Tanner v.
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United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), and F.R.E. 606(b) in rejecting the contention that a
rule preventing an attorney from interviewing jurors violates the First Amendment).
State jurisdictions have also rejected First Amendment arguments involving an
attorney's post-verdict interview with jurors. In Benton,. 980 S.W.2d at 432, the court
recognized, "it is well established in the law that post-verdict speech can also pose a
significant threat to the fairness of jury trials to justify curtailing the would-be speakers'
constitutional interests." Relying in part upon Haeberle, 739 F.2d at 1022, and Tarmer,
483 U.S. at 120-21, the Texas court recognized, "Courts have used the same reasoning to
uphold restrictions on post-verdict questioning of jurors against a variety of constitutional
challenges by criminal defendants and civil litigants." Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 432.
"[T]hese and related cases specifically recognize that the state's interest in protecting the
jury system includes preventing post-verdict juror harassment." Id., at 432-33. Finally,
the court concluded, "If post-verdict interviews are permitted, the cases reason, that fact
will become common knowledge among jurors, and the anticipation of such interviews
will affect jurors' behavior in deliberations." Id. at 433.
These general principles have also been applied in capital cases. For example, in
State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d I, 96-97 (N.J. 1997), the coilli focused upon "sound reasons
of policy, including the prevention of juror harassment and the avoidance of chilling jury
deliberations" and expressly recognized the practice of requiring some showing of
extraneous influence before permitting a party to interview jurors "is particularly
appropriate when the jury has already been discharged."

In rejecting the First

Amendment argument, the court explained, "The compelling public interest in protecting
jurors and their deliberations amply justifies the restriction on contacting them without
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good cause." rd., at 97; see also State v. Loftin, 670 S.2d 557, 573-74 (N.J. 1996) (citing
cases rejecting First Amendment challenges to rules limiting an attorney's ability to
interview jurors); State v. Cabrera, 2008 WL 3853992, *20-22 (Del. 2008) (unpublished).
Presuming the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard applies and
relying upon Gentile, supra, Hall contends the district court's order targeted "all
communications Mr. Hall's attorneys might have with jurors, without regard for whether
the communications" meet the presumed standard. (Brief, p.l2.) Hall's reliance upon
Gentile is misplaced; the Court did not conclude the attorney's pre-trial statements were
protected speech. Rather, five Justices concluded Nevada's rule did not violate the First
Amendment. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to the First Amendment claim, in which Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia
and Souter joined. rd., at 1032. Gentile was reversed based upon a void for vagueness
challenge addressed by Justice Kennedy in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
and O'Conner joined. rd. On this basis alone, Hall's argument fails. Moreover, Gentile
actually supports the state's position because after merely reviewing the policies behind
the regulation of lawyers' speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, "The restraint on
speech is narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives." rd. at 1075-76.
The district court recognized the policies associated with limiting post-verdict
interviews and, after Hall refused the state's offer to have the jurors interviewed under
court supervision, properly denied Hall's motion. The question was not whether Hall's
attorneys acted "unprofessionally if left to their own devices" (Brief, p.l2), but the
policies associated with preventing post-verdict juror interviews as articulated above.
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For these same reasons, Hall's contention that the district court's order was not
narrowly tailored because it "failed to consider any reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions" (Brief, pp.16-17) also fails. Hall expressly rejected the state's offer to more
narrowly tailor the court's order by having the jurors examined under court supervision
because "[tJhere are so many psychological reasons for not doing that. And there's no
support in law. Again, there's nothing prohibiting us from contacting these people."
(UP CPA, Tf., 8-8-07, p.l21.) Not only did Hall fail to provide any evidence supporting
his claim that there are "psychological reasons for not doing that," but he clearly wanted
all or nothing.

In other words, if he could not have unbridled and unsupervised

interviews with the jurors, he wanted no interviews.

Hall is now barred from

complaining that the district court's order was not narrowly tailored.
2.

The District Court's Order Does Not Violate Due Process

Contending he has a due process right to "meaningful post-conviction
proceedings," Hall contends the district court's order violated his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process.

(Brief, pp.8, 18.)

Assuming arguendo that Hall

actually has a due process right to conduct post-conviction proceedings, he has failed to
establish the district court's order violated that right.
The state recognizes Hall's attorneys have a duty to conduct an investigation
during post-conviction proceedings. However, as explained in section I(D) above, that
duty is not dictated by the ABA nor does it permit an unfettered and unbridled
investigation that allows for fishing expeditions. See Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148 (postconviction cases are "not a vehicle for unrestrained testimony or retesting of physical
evidence introduced at the criminal trial"). Rather, a "direct appeal is the primary avenue
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for review of a conviction or sentence." Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 887; see also Rodgers, 129
Idaho at 725 ("The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for postconviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal").
As explained in MalDonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 770
(5 th Cir. 1986), "The defendant's right to a fair trial is not absolute; it may be outweighed
by other considerations, including the jury's right to privacy and protection from
harassment." Based upon the considerations of a juror's right to privacy and protection
from harassment, the courts have uniformly rejected claims that restrictions on
interviewing jurors violate due process. See e.g., Xiong v. Felker, 2009 WL 1438979,
*8-10 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Floyd v. State, --- So.3d ---, 2009 WL 1544273, *21 (Fla. 2009);
Israel v. State, 985 So.2d 510, 522-23 (Fla. 2008) (citing Johnson v. State, 804 So.2d
1218, 1224-25 (Fla. 2001»; In re Bowling, 2005 WL 924323, *3 (Ky. 2005)
(unpublished); State v. Harris, 859 A.2d 364, 434 (N.J. 2004) (citing State v. Loftin, 680
A.2d 677, 720 (N.J. 1996».
3.

The District Court's Order Does Not Violate The Eighth Amendment

When every other argument fails, capital litigants, like Hall, fall back to perennial
"death is different" argument. (Brief, p.19.) As explained in section I(D) above, while
the courts have applied such safeguards in limited situations, Hall has failed to cite a
single case in which the Eighth Amendment has been used to salvage a claim involving
post-verdict interviews with jurors during post-conviction proceedings.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has never adopted a "death is different approach" to post conviction
discovery issues.

As explained above, the Idaho Legislature enacted legislation to

expedite capital cases, not facilitate delay associated with unbridled discovery. See also
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Fields, 135 Idaho at 286 (applying Idaho's post-conviction discovery rule, LC.R. 57, to a
capital case).

As repeatedly discussed, Hall's motion to conduct post-verdict juror

interviews was nothing more than a fishing expedition, which has never been tolerated by
any court. Finally, as detailed throughout section II, restrictions on post-verdict juror
interviews have been regularly and consistently upheld in capital cases without applying
additional safeguards that have been required in a limited number of capital issues.

D.

Absent Rule Or Statutorv Authority, The District Court Had Inherent Authority
To Prohibit Unfettered Contact With The Jurors
Presumably, Hall assumed the district court had inherent authority because he was

unable to find any case stating a judge does not have inherent authority to limit juror
contact after the jury's service has been completed. In Townsel v. Superior Court, 979
P.2d 963, 967 (CaL 1999), the court recognized, "Despite the absence of any affirmative
statutory power, trial courts exercised their inherent powers to ensure jurors were
protected, following their discharge from a trial, from threats to their physical safety and
invasions of their personal privacy." The court explained, "we [have] found the trial
court had the inherent power to impose the limitation, explaining that' [a] trial court has
inherent as well as statutory discretion to control the proceedings to ensure the
efficacious administration of justice' and that, in exercising such discretion the trial court
may deny to the losing party in a legal proceeding 'unqualified access to the jury after the
conclusion of the triaL'"

Id., at 968 (quoting People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 401 (Cal.

1991)). The courts' inherent authority is premised upon '''strong public policies [that]
protect discharged jurors from improper[] intrusive conduct in all cases, ", which
constitutes "a substantial threat to the administration of justice" when it remains
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uncontrolled. Id., at 967 (quoting In re Hamilton, 975 P.2d 600, 629 n.23 (Cal. 1999»;
see also Crider v. State, 29 P.3d 577, 578 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (If a juror reports
harassment, the trial court has the inherent authority to issue a protective order, upon
application and for cause, prohibiting a named person or persons from having further
contact with that juror").
The federal courts are in agreement. As explained in Miller v. United States, 403
F .2d 77, 81-82 (2nd Cir. 1968), "we see no basis for doubting the authority of the trial
judge to direct that any interrogation of jurors after the conviction shall be under his
supervision." While the court recognized the questioning of jurors after conviction "is
indeed appropriate for court rule, the absence of one does not deprive a judge of power to
act in an individual case." Id., at 82; see also United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 665
(2 nd Cir. 1978) ("in order to insure that jurors are protected from harassment, a district
judge has the power, and sometimes the duty, to order that post-trial investigation of
jurors shall be under his supervision").
While Idaho has not expressly addressed the question of whether courts have
inherent authority to restrict juror contact after a verdict has been entered, the Idaho
Supreme Court recently addressed the question of inherent authority in In re Facilities
and Equipment Provided by City of Boise, --- Idaho ---, --- P.3d ---, 2009 WL 2594878,
*7 (2009).

Relying in part upon I.C. § 1-1622, which codifies the court's inherent

authority, the court concluded, "Courts have the inherent power to grant intervention to
persons who may be adversely affected by the outcome of a proceeding or when

27

equitable principles otherwise require.,,2 Id. Certainly, allowing the courts to protect
jurors from being harassed by the unwarranted invasion of their right to privacy "is in
accordance with the spirit of the Idaho Code." Id.
The court's inherent authority to protect jurors is exemplified in Idaho Criminal
Jury Instruction ("ICJI") 232, which reads as follows:
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are
discharged with the sincere thanks of this Court. The question may arise
as to whether you may discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone
else. For your guidance, the Court instructs you that whether you talk to
the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper
for you to discuss this case, if you wish to, but you are not required to do
so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you
choose to, you may tell them as much or as little as you like, but you
should be careful to respect the privacy and feelings of your fellow jurors.
Remember that they understood their deliberations to be confidential.
Therefore, you should limit your comments to your own perceptions and
feelings. If anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection,
or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any
discussion has begun, please report to me.
(Emphasis added).
If the courts have inherent authority to guard against harassment of jurors postverdict when so advised by a juror, certainly the courts have the same authority to guard
against harassment even if not so advised by a juror. If that authority does not exist and
courts cannot intervene when requested by a juror, the implied promise of intervention
from ICJI 232 is indeed hollow and should no longer be given by judges.

2 Idaho Code § 1-1622 reads as follows, "When jurisdiction is, by this code, or by any
other statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means necessary to carry it
into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction if the course of
proceedings be not specifically pointed out by this code, or the statute, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted, which may appear most conformable to
the spirit of this code."
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E.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Hall's Motion For
Juror Contact
While Hall notes the district court's discussion on January 6, 2006, during an

informal telephone conference regarding contact with the jurors, and the resulting
motions, hearings, and rulings that stemmed from that conference (Brief, pp.20-22), the
only issue before this Court is whether the district court abused its discretion by denying
his June 1, 2007 Motion for Juror Contact. While the proceedings, motions, hearings and
rulings prior to that motion provide interesting and important background, the time to
challenge any prior rulings in the context of an interlocutory appeal has long since
expired. See I.A.R. 12(c)(1). Therefore, Hall's contention that he "did not ask the court
to order jury interviews through discovery or otherwise facilitate his contact with jurors"
(Brief, p.25) is untrue. Based upon the district court's orders prior to June 1, 2007, which
Hall has not appealed, that is exactly what he did by filing his Motion for Juror Contact.
Therefore, the standards detailed in section I(C) above apply to Hall's Motion for Juror
Contact, and mandate a showing that the interviews were required to protect his
"substantial rights." Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605.
Hall next contends the district court exceeded its authority because there was no
"evidence his attorneys or their agents committed (or intended to commit) misconduct."
(Brief, p.25.)

While the state concedes there was no evidence establishing Hall's

attorneys or agents were involved in or intended to commit misconduct, as previously
explained, that is not the standard. Rather, "courts have routinely shielded jurors from
post-trial 'fishing expeditions' carried out by losing attorneys interested in casting doubt
on the jury's verdict." Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233,1236 (loth Cir.
1986) (citing cases). As detailed above, "the courts have properly exercised their right to

29

protect jurors from unwanted post-trial harassment" and "upheld the denial of a motion
by a losing attorney to interview jurors because that attorney's assertion of jury
misconduct was unsubstantiated." Id.
For example, in Anderson, 2009 WL 1954982, *14, five years after his trial, the
defendant moved to interview jurors to ascertain whether any of the jurors saw that he
was shackled during his trial. Affirming the trial court's rejection of the motion, the
Florida Supreme Court explained:
Because there is no indication in the record that any of the shackles
were perceptible to any members of the jury, we agree with the circuit
court's decision and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion. To have granted the motion would have allowed
Anderson to conduct a "fishing expedition" interview of the jurors, a
practice which we have previously rejected.

Florida is not the only jurisdiction that bars post-verdict interviews absent some
specific evidence of misconduct.

In Haeberle, 739 F.2d at 1021, the Fifth Circuit

discussed the federal courts' position on post-verdict juror interviews, which does not
have a specific statute or rule prohibiting such interviews, as follows:
Federal cOUlis have generally disfavored post-verdict interviewing
of jurors. We have repeatedly refused to denigrate jury. trials by
afterwards ransacking the jurors in search of some new ground not
previously supported by evidence, for a new trial. Prohibiting post-verdict
interviews protects the jury from an effort to find grounds for post-verdict
charges of misconduct, reduces the "chances and temptations" for
tampering with the jury, increases the certainty of civil trials and spares
the districts courts time-consUll1ing and futile proceedings. We have
therefore uniformly refused to upset the denial of leave to interview jurors
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of improprieties in the . deliberations
unless specific evidence of misconduct was shown by testimony or
affidavit.
Id. (citing cases).
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In United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988), the court
reiterated, "Requests to impeach jury verdicts by post-trial contact with jurors are
disfavored." Because the defendaut "made no threshold showing of improper outside
influence," the Fourth Circuit determined the trial court's denial of the request for postverdict interviews was not au abuse of discretion aud without such showing of improper
outside influence, "defendant's request is a mere fishing expedition." Id.
Reviewing "sound policy reasons for insulating a jury's deliberative process from
public scrutiny in order to ensure finality in the verdict, as well as to maintain public
confidence in the jury system," which were explained in Tanner, 483 U.S. at 118-19, the
court in Sokoloff, concluded, "post-verdict juror interviews based on such wholly
unreliable 'evidence' fundamentally undermines the larger policy considerations
expressed by the Supreme Court in Tanner." 696 F.Supp.1451, 1455-56.
Recognizing the "Iong-stauding common-law rule against inquiring into jurors'
motives to impeach their verdict," which was discussed in Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, in a capital case, explained, "For sound reasons of policy,
including the prevention of juror harassment aud the avoidauce of chilling jury
deliberations, courts typically require some showing of extraueous influence before
permitting a party to interview jurors. [Cases omitted]. That practice is particularly
appropriate when the jury has already been discharged." Marshall, 690 A.2d at 280.
In Townsel, 979 P.2d at 965, a case remarkably similar to Hall's, the trial court
entered a sua sponte order that "there's to be no jury contact without prior court approval.
In other words, if you do come upbn a juror questionnaire that you do waut to contact that
person, then you'll have to petition the Court, giving forth your reasons before that would
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be granted." When asked the reason for the order, the court replied, "r just think it's only
fair that jurors not be contacted unless there's some cause, not to go out and disturb them
on a fishing expedition." rd. Like other courts, the California Supreme Court recognized
that "'strong public policies protect discharged jurors from improperly intrusive conduct
in all cases,'" which include, "a juror's state constitutional right to privacy; the possible
deterrence of prospective jurors from fulfilling their obligation to serve if they knew they
would be subject to postverdict intrusions into their lives; reducing incentives for jury
tampering; promoting free and open discussion among jurors in deliberations; and
protecting the finality of verdicts." rd. at 968. Although recognizing this was a capital
case, the court noted the period of time since the jury had completed its service and
ultimately concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering appellate
counsel approach jurors through the court, which permitted the court to "act as a neutral
third party, serving to apprise the jurors of counsel's interest and to determine, in the first
instance, if a juror will consent to an interview." rd. at 97l.
Even a cursory review of Hall's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Juror
Contact and the "anticipated questioning of jurors" (UPCPA, exhibit 12) reveals his
motion was merely a fishing expedition. For example, Hall contended "[s]everal critical
State witnesses were not disclosed on the juror questionnaire or during voir dire" and "[i]t
is imperative that counsel inquire into the jurors [sic] knowledge of and relationship to
the undisclosed witnesses." (rd., pp.13-14.) However, even if a juror had "knowledge of
and relationship to an undisclosed witness," Hall completely failed to explain how such a
finding was related to his amended petition or that he would otherwise be entitled to postconviction relief. As explained in Anderson, 2009 WL 1954982, *14, Hall's request to
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inquire of jurors regarding an "awareness" of his wearing shackles (UPCPA, exhibit 12,
p.14) was merely a fishing expedition; he provided no information "that any of the
shackles were perceptible to any members of the jury," but merely based his request upon
speculation.

Hall provided no evidence that during voir dire or in their juror

questionnaires any juror "failed to disclose material information, but merely noted a case
that apparently discusses actual bias if a juror "lies concerning his background on juror
questionnaire and during voir dire." (Id., p.14.) Likewise, Hall provided absolutely no
information that any juror "conducted experiments, visited the crime scene, or otherwise
considered extra record evidence" or was "influenced by non-jurors or other extraneous
evidence." (Id., p.l5.) Moreover, these types of requests are a direct attempt to question
jurors regarding deliberations, clearly prohibited by the policies underlying LR.E. 606(b).
In fact, the entirety of Hall's "general inquiries" (id., pp.l3-18) are nothing more than a
fishing expedition which will lead to the harassment and intimidation of jurors who
honorably completed their jury service. This type of behavior was properly rejected by
the district court and cannot be countenanced by this Court.
Hall's "inquiries specific to certain jurors" are just as offensive. (UPCP A, exhibit
12, pp.18-28.) For example, Hall wishes to question juror Linda Ostolasa regarding a
statement she made during voir dire and whether "personal constraints impacted the time
taken to deliberate at sentencing" (id., p.18), a clear attack against the deliberative
process and a personal attack regarding Ostolasa's deliberative process without any
evidence to support the allegation.

Likewise, despite being questioned during voir dire

regarding her use of the Greenbelt, Hall desires to question juror Betty Mitchell as to
"whether the juror's extensive use of the Greenbelt affected her views of the crime or Mr.
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Hall" (id., p.19), another attack against the deliberative process and personal attack
regarding whether Mitchell followed the district court's jury instructions. Most of Hall's
"specific" questions are linked with questions raised during voir dire. However, voir dire
is nearly always a tactical decision that cannot be impugned. See Mitchell v. State, 132
Idaho 274, 279, 971 P.2d 727 (1998); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892,910 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901,906 (9 th Cir. 1980» ("The conduct of
voir dire 'will in most instances involve the exercise of a judgment which should be left
to competent defense counsel''').

Without some factual basis for making these

allegations, Hall's attacks against the deliberative process and specific jurors is
unwarranted and prohibited by the policies associated with LR.E. 606(b).
Finally, Hall contends the district court misinterpreted LR.E. 606(b) (Brief, p.25),
which reads as follows:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course
of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, nor maya juror's affidavit or evidence
of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, but a
juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may
be questioned about or may execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or
not the jury determined any issue by resort to chance.
Hall's contention regarding I.R.E. 606(b) is misplaced because the district court
did not rely upon the actual rule to deny his motion, but the underlying policies that
support the rule. As explained in Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 197
n.3, 75 P.3d 1202 (2003), the policy goals of LR.E. 606(b) include, "to promote finality,
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protect jurors from post-trial inquiry or harassment, and to avoid the practical concern
that an affidavit by a juror to impeach the verdict is potentially unreliable."
Obviously, the policy goals of I.R.E. 606(b) and those associated with limiting
post-verdict juror interviews are similar if not identical. Therefore, the district court's
reliance upon l.R.E. 606(b), particularly the policy goals surrounding the rule, is
supported by existing law, did not create a new rule abridging Hall's rights, or impede his
right to conduct a post-conviction investigation. Rather, it was Hall's complete failure to
demonstrate any basis, let alone "good cause" or the denial of his substantive rights that
resulted in the district court's decision to deny his motion to interview jurors. Because
Hall failed to demonstrate any basis for those interviews, he has failed to establish the
district court abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the district court's interlocutory orders,
including (1) Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petitioner's Supplemental
Motion for Discovery and (2) Court's Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Juror
Contact, be affirmed on appeal.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2009.

1. LaMONT ANDER
Deputy Attorney Ge eral
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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